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This thesis focuses upon a new method for verifying the correct operation of a complex,
high speed fiber optic communication network. These networks are of growing importance
to the military because of their increased connectivity, survivability, and reconfigurability.
With the introduction and increased dependence on sophisticated software and protocols,
it is cssr, tial that their operation be correct. Because of the speed and complexity of fiber
optic communication networks being designed today, they are becoming increasingly
difficult to test. Previously, testing was accomplished by application of conformance test
methods which had little connection with an implementation's specification. The major
goal of conformance testing is to ensure that the implementation of a profile is consistent
with its specification. Formal specification is needed to ensure that the implementation
performs its intended operations while exhibiting desirable behaviors. The new
conformance test method presented is based upon the System of Communicating Machine
model which uses a formal protocol specification of the implementation to generate a test
sequence.
The major contribution of this thesis is the application of the System of Communicating
Machine model to formal profile specifications of the Survivable Adaptable Fiber Optic
Embedded Network (SAFENET) standard which results in the derivation of test sequences
for a SAFENET profile. The results of applying this new method to SAFENET's OSI and
Acce,,ion For
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The Survivable Adaptable Fiber Optic Embedded Network (SAFENET) is part of the
United States Navy's Next Generation Computer Resources (NGCR) program and
represents an effort to meet the data transfer demands of current and future naval shipboard
mission critical computer systems through development of standard computer network
profiles. SAFENET represents a Local Area Network (LAN) grouping of standards,
encompassing the seven ISO/OSI model layers. SAFENET is a program being researched
and developed by a joint Navy-Industry working group to formulate standard commercial
network methods to fit the requirements of the Navy's various combat platforms. Whenever
possible, the joint working group intends to select well developed industry standards. The
Navy's NGCR team is chartered to investigate methods for future shipboard hardware and
software development to meet the Navy's requirements of survivability, increased
connectivity, performance and future system growth capabilities [GREE89] [HDBK92].
SAFENET is an effort to meet the needs of current and future systems used aboard the
Navy's combat ships, submarines, and aircraft.
Over the course of time, network designers learned that ambiguous rules can trigger
undesirable sequences of events which can have adverse effects on the best design;
therefore, it is essential that communication networks and their protocols be adequately
tested. Entire networks, with possibly hundreds or even thousands of attached computers
can be rendered essentially useless by a faulty protocol or profile. With every passing day
our society is becoming more dependent on communication networks and their protocols.
Consequently, with so many lives and costly equipment at stake it is imperative to test these
profiles and protocols to ensure that they perform as intended. This thesis presents a
conformance test method that is based upon earlier work [MILL90]. In this thesis, the
conformance test method utilized is based upon a formal specification. In addition,
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applications of the test method using real world SAFENET profiles as examples will be
demonstrated.
B. BACKGROUND
Currently, in the Navy, computers are usually found configured in point-to-point
interfaces. However, the growing trend of distributed architectures in modern naval
combat systems requires a greater degree of system integration than present point-to-point
interfaces can support. As a result, the SAFENET standards are being developed to solve
communications connectivity and system integration problems by providing the shipboard
computers with the capability to communicate with multiple devices and application
programs over a single Input/Output port through the use of a computer network and to
provide future system growth capacity.
To ensure that the elements of a complex communications network such as SAFENET
communicate reliably once the system has been implemented, the protocols of the system
should be verified against all system design requirements. In this manner, instances of
incompleteness in a protocol specification can be located using protocol verification
techniques. Provided formal specifications have been done, conformance testing is an
essential step to ensuring accomplishment of intended functions without error. Effectively
testing protocols with otner software and hlardware systems presents a difficult problem.
Conformance testing's major goal is to ensure that the implementation of the protocol is
consistent with its specification. Therefore, it is highly advantageous that the specification
be expressed in a formal model that has been formally verified. A recent paper by Miller
[MILL90], pointed out the developing rift between specification and verification, and
between these two and conformance testing. Protocol models, designed for specification
purposes, tend to have powerful program language constructs, which simplify specification
but leads to a higher degree of verification and analysis difficulty. The Communicating
Finite State Machine (CFSM) model is too simple for the specification of modem, complex
2
protocols because this protocol model is designed primarily with analysis in mind
[LUND9 I1.
C. CONTENTS
This thesis attempts to bridge the gap between SAFENET specification and testing.
Assuming that all SAFENET protocols are not available in a form convenient for testing,
simplifying the difficulty associated with verification, analysis and testing, we start from a
protocol model called Systems of Communicating Machines (SCM). A procedure is
presented for the generation of a test sequence for a protocol specified in terms of the
SAFENET model. Then, the SAFENET procedure is used to generate a test sequence for a
SAFENET protocol implementation.
The testing of any complex software is known to be a difficult problem, and this
certainly applies to the testing of SAFENET protocols. Because SAFENET protocols are
critical to so many systems, it is a problem which cannot be avoided or ignored. The
procedure presented in this thesis does not detect all errors or combinations of errors. Only
exhaustive testing can accomplish this, but substantial resources are required. The approach
does, however represent an attempt to exercise a portion of a SAFENET protocol machine.
thereby providing some assurance that the implementation fulfills its purpose.
Presently, there are two standards under development SAFENET I and SAFENET II.
This thesis focuses on SAFENET II which uses the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) LAN that operates at 100 Mbps. In the
following chapter the FDDI standard is discussed. In Chapter [Il, the SAFENET Draft
Standard is discussed followed by Chapter 1"; which discusses problems found in the
SAFENET Draft Standard. In Chapter V, the testing of fiber optic links is discussed. In




The FDDI standard is focused on the comprehensive implementation of
communications through fiber optics; with fiber optics, information is passed through
modulated beams of light on glass fiber rather than the more antiquated electronic pulses
on copper wire. In large backbone Local Area Networks (LANs), FDDI has several
advantages over copper wire. Fiber is oblivious to lightening strikes, to the Electro-
Magnetic Pulse (EMP) phenomenon associated with 'iuclear detonations and to their
resultant current surges that can damage connected equipment and cause safety hazards.
Furthermore, fiber is not subject to radio or Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) and is
generally less restrictive in its environment, requiring far less space in existing cable runs.
FDDI utilizes two counter-rotating token rings. The typical FDDI configuration has
the primary ring carrying data and the secondary ring being used for automatic bypass and
recovery (Figure 1). Current networks in service are generally comprised of CSMA/CD
protocols, which limit transmission rates to 10 Mbps, shorter cable runs, and rapidly
decreasing efficiency as the network load increases because of data collision resolution.
The use of a ring topology offers the advantage of data collision elimination, which
provides for very high effective data rates. Unlike CSMAICD topologies (such as
Ethernet), FDDI's performance does not degrade significantly with increased levels of
traffic, up to 95% of its rated capacity. FDDI networks can bypass hardware failures. When
a node or link fails, the two counter rotating paths wrap together around the fault thus
allowing continued communications. Any fault on FDDI dual rings can be isolated,
keeping the remainder of the rings completely active. When the fault is corrected the fiber
optic ring reconfigures automatically. This ability to adapt to breaks or node failures helps
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Figure 1 Typical FDDI configuration
A special bit pattern, called a token, is continuously circulated by the FDDI ring.
Stations transmit data by capturing the token, transmitting their traffic, and sending the
token to the next station on the network until a complete circuit is made. FDDI supports
two types of traffic transmissions: synchronous and asynchronous. Synchronous service is
designed for applications with predictable bandwidths and critical response times.
Asynchronous services are designed for applications with bursty, widely varying
bandwidth requirements. To accommodate asynchronous, "non-deterministic" traffic a
Target Token Rotation Time ('TT'RT) is defined and negotiated during ring initialization.
Each station maintains the same value for TTRT. Each station's Token Rotation Timer
(TRT) is initialized to TTRT when enabled. The TRT counts down until TRT = 0 and is then
reset to TTRT. The variable Late Count (LC) is initialized to zero (LC = 0) and is
Interfac
incremented each time TRT reaches zero. In this manner, the Late Count counter records
the number of times TRT has expired since the token was last received by a designated
station. If TRT does not reach zero and LC is zero, the token is considered to have arrived
early. When a station receives the token early, after transmitting any synchronous frames,
it may transmit asynchronous frames for a period not to exceed the remaining TRT. Once
the allotment of asynchronous frames are transmitted, the token is passed to the next station
and both TRT and LC are reinitialized [STAL88]. Synchronous traffic is "deterministic"
because each station is guaranteed token service within a specified time limit and for a
specified allocation. In the event that a station has asynchronous, "non-deterministic"
traffic to transmit, upon receipt of the token the station, first, transmits any synchronous
traffic up to its allocation; then, if there is time remaining as the result of an early token
arrival due to decreased synchronous allocation usage or if excess bandwidth is present, the
asynchronous traffic will be transmitted.
Utilizing FDDI as the backbone LAN offers other advantages. In addition to satisfying
the need of connecting LANS together without compromising inter-LAN speed, FDDI
offers capability that will enable future technologies, including circuit switching. Like most
networks, FDDI is a packet switched network, utilizing FDDI packets to facilitate the
efficient transmission of data in various sizes. FDDI frames vary in length, have their own
delimiting start and end markers, and contain their own destination addresses (Figure 2).
By using an upward compatible extension of FDDI known as FDDI-II, FDDI gains the
capability to perform circuit-switched service in addition to normal packet switching
[ROSS89]. This permits future special applications which require real-time response from
the network, including digital voice; rapid updating of tactical displays in battle may be
another application. Ross describes the circuit switched connection as a "data stream,"
which provides for the transmission of continuous (analog) data.
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Figure 2 FDDI Frame Format
FDDI rings support two types of stations: dual attach stations (DAS), which attach
directly to the ring, and single attach stations (SAS), such as PC's and work stations. Each
DAS has four fiber connections, two to receive and transmit on the primary ring, and two
to receive and transmit on the secondary ring. A typical DAS can be a concentrator, bridge,
router, server, minicomputer or mainframe. Multiple DASs are linked together to form the
network backbone. A SAS can be immediately isolated in case of fault detection without
disrupting traffic on the ring.
In a distributed network environment, all the DASs in a FDDI ring participate in
network capability, fault recovery, management, and network initialization. Internal DAS
timers and logic control resolution of all ring failures provide bypass handling. Therefore.
the counter-rotating ring topology allows the network to continue functioning in the event
that either a node or link is lost. It is this survivability, in addition to its very high
bandwidth, that makes FDDI most suitable to a battle environment. Optical fiber minimizes
interference and signal degradation, and minimizes signal loss over long cable runs. Due to
the extremely large bandwidth of fiber, bit-serial transmission may be used, offering the
advantage of hardware simplicity, decreased complexity, and increased reliability
[ROSS89]. Reliability is a key factor for the Navy in both normal peacetime operations and
while at battle. This interest in reliability and communications connectivity led to the
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Figure 3 SAFENET Protocol Profile
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III. SAFENET BACKGROUND
SAFENET is based on the FDDI token-ring standard and incorporates profiles for both
ISO compatibility and real time performance. By employing the seven layer ISO reference
model for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), SAFENET specifies protocols at each
layer of this model, defining the complete SAFENET profile. In SAFENET, this protocol
profile is organized in two ways: by service partitions and by defined profiles.
A. SERVICE PARTITIONS
The first method of SAFENET's communicating architecture divides the protocol
profile into three service partitions: user services, transfer services, and LAN services. Each
of these partitions encompasses a portion of the seven layers of the ISO reference model.
Figure 3 delineates the seven layers of the ISO reference model on the left, the major
elements of the SAFENET profile in the center, and the service partitions on the right. The
user services partition corresponds to the session, presentation, and application layers of the
ISO reference model (layers 5-7) and is that portion of the SAFENET profile in which users
interact with the network. The user services partition afford SAFENET users with Cie
capability to interact with, manage, and respond to the underlying transfer services. In the
center of the SAFENET profile lies the transfer services partition. It corresponds to the
network, transport and Logical Link Control (LLC) sublayer of the Data Link Layer, (layers
2-4) of the ISO reference model. Through these services reliable communication
mechanisms are provided to SAFENET users. The LAN services partition is that part of the
SAFENET profile which performs the actual data transfer and corresponds to the physical
layer of the ISO reference model as well as the media access control sublayer of the data
link layer (layers 1-2). The LAN services consist of the upload and download ability to get
data on and off the physical medium in a controlled manner.
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B. PROTOCOL SUITES
The second descriptive method of SAFENET communications architecture separates
the protocols into defined profiles: the OSI protocol profile, lightweight protocol profile,
and the combined protocol profile. As depicted in figures 4, 5, and 6, these profiles define
the three distinct implementation classes permitted in SAFENET. It is not required that all
stations on a given SAFENET network implement the same profiles. Each respective
profile describes a specific combination of network protocols defined within SAFENET.
When designing a SAFENET station, at least one of the profiles (OSI, Lightweight, and
Combined profiles) must be implemented. However, network designers must ensure the
presence of sufficient profiles at each station to ensure that the system meets its designed
communications connectivity. Some of the services and protocols are common to all
implementation classes and others are used only in the OSI or lightweight profiles.The
SAFENET Time Service (STS) is required for all protocol suite implementations.
The OSI protocol suite, possessing protocols and services based upon ISO standards,
provides complete OSI compliant networking services to systems which require it. The OSI
protocol suite consists of Manufacturing Automation Protocol (MAP) private
communications, ISO File Transfer, Access and Management (FTAM), Directory Services,
Association Control Service Element (ACSE), Remote Operations Service Element
(ROSE), System Management Application Service Element (SMASE), Common
Management Information Service Element (CMISE), presentation and session layers,
Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol (COTP), ISO Connectionless Transport Protocol
(CLTP) which allows the user to transmit a single unit of data, datagram, without
establishing a connection, ISO Connectionless Network Protocol (CLNP) which provides
services for network routing and for the segmentation and reassembly of transport layer
messages that are too large for the underlying communications service, ES/IS routing
exchange protocol which provides stations with the ability to associate a data link layer
address with a given network layer address, IS/IS intra-domain routing protocol which
dynamically determines routes to pass data between intermediate systems, LLC type I
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(connectionless) protocol and the FDDI protocols. The ISO connection oriented Transport
protocol class 4 (TP4) is required within the transfer services partition [ISO870]. This is
done to ensure interoperability in an open systems environment. The OSI protocol suite is
basically required when either the interoperability of independently developed nodes is a
driving consideration, or the file handling capabilities of FTAM are required, or increased
complexity requires network management; however, it adds this capability at the expense
of delayed data flow and inability to supply multiple users simultaneously [KOCH91l
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Figure 4 Overview of the OSI Profile
In circumstances where control of timing is critical from a resource point of view, the
lightweight protocol suite provides process to process message passing services. The
message passing services support point to point, multicast, and remote procedure call
(transaction) styles of service; however, multicast capability is limited to a single logical
LAN segment [HDBK92I. The lightweight profile provides real time data transfer
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capability to various systems, as well as providing added options. The lightweight protocol
suite consists of lightweight application services, the Xpress Transfer Protocol (XTP), ISO
CLTP, ISO CLNP, ES/IS routing exchange protocol, IS/IS intra- domain routing protocol,
LLC protocol and the FDDI protocols. This profile permits implementors to develop a set
of communication services which support the performance and architecture requirements
of a specific system. The lightweight profile provides a limited set of network management
capabilities. If this service is required then the combined protocol suite must be utilized.
Finally, while this lightweight protocol suite provides fast data transfer, it does not adhere
to the ISO standard protocol and therefore is very system specific [KOCH91]. Figure 5
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Figure 6 Overview of the Combined Profile
The combined profile is essentially the union of the OSI and lightweight protocol
profiles. The combined protocol suite is intended for situations that require the capabilities
of both the OSI and lightweight protocols. Therefore, all the protocols, services and
capabilities of OSI and lightweight profiles are included. Additionally, network
management protocols and services are provided for those protocol enrities contained
within the lightweight profile. However, because of the combined capability of this suite, it
15
requires much more complex development energy and cost [KOCH9 I]. Figure 6 shows an
overview of the combined profile.
C. SAFENET TOPOLOGY
The basic topology design for SAFENET utilizes a redundant ring structure as shown
in figure 1. The critical element of SAFENET's topology is the trunk Coupling Unit (TCU).
The TCU device enables a station to insert or remove itself from a network ring. The TCU
is a 2x2 optical bypass switch, which is controlled by an electrical signal from the attached
station. The TCU has the capability to readily isolate a failed station from the network,
thereby contributing to system reliability [PAIG90]. Optical signals are transmitted in
opposite directions on each of the two rings. It is clear from this redundant ring topology
that accurate and timely data flow is essential to the performance of SAFENET.
Accordingly, as its name implies, SAFENET uses fiber optic technology as the physical
medium in which data is exchanged. Consequently, this fiber optic technology forms the
backbone of SAFENET's development.
D. SAFENET FIBER OPTIC DEVELOPMENT
The developers of SAFENET chose to employ a newer fiber optic technology over the
older copper cables. For optical cables incorporate a number of excellent properties which
provide data exchange for high-capacity transmission systems [JOHN87]. A major
advantage of fiber optics is the large bandwidth times distance products obtained which
allow data transmission rates of up to several Gbps [LI1983]. Furthermore, today's fibers
typically offer bit rates of several hundred Mbps [IFOC84) and ILUND91 ). Additionally,
since glass is a dielectric medium, immune to electromagnetic interference and free from
sparking, these optical fibers are useful in EMI-rich and other hostile environments. Low
attenuation combined with its extremely small physical dimensions make optical fibers the
physical medium of choice [FINL84].
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As shown in Figure 1, each network ring is composed of TCUs and connecting trunk
cables. The primary and secondary ring trunk cables are intended to be physically separated
to enhance survivability in the event of battle damage. This placement strategy of allowing
key network components (e.g., TCU and DAS) to be separated will allow the network to
absorb some damage without the entire system losing its ability to operate.
It is understood that for an active ringz either a node failure or a fiber break will cause
a fatal crash. To correct this deficiency, SAFENET has added a second ring in the opposite
direction as discussed earlier. This configuration allows for two types of network
reconfiguration in the presence of a fault in the cable: ring hop/hold and ring wrap. Ring
wrap is caused by a fault in the primary and secondary rings, the faulty sections of both
rings are isolated by forming one or more rings out of the remaining portions of the primary




Figure 7 -\n overview of component systems comprising SAFENET
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Figure 7 depicts the manner in which each component or warfare speciality area is
unified into a whole. Each component, alone, is a system; yet, the synergism inherent in
SAFENET's configuration and survivability features make it even more formidable.
18
tv. THE SAFENET STANDARD
A. THE SAFENET STANDARD AND ITS TESTABILITY
The SAFENET manual provides requirements for the implementation of fiber optic
local area networks which are intended for use in support of mission critical computer
resources. The SAFENET standard is organizationally well written, but it is large, and
complex in its potential interprofile relationships. Each protocol within a SAFENET profile
can be viewed as a finite state machine. The task of figuring out which protocol machines
are expected to communicate within each profile can be awesome and daunting to some.
While concrete design specifications are not expected to be contained in the manual.
abstract design specifications should have and would have proven very useful to designers.
As a result of neither abstract nor concrete design specifications, the SAFENET manual
must be closely scrutinized and intra-profile relationships gleaned to garner all implicit
relationships bit by bit in order to attain a formal specification.
The standards manual references in several cases existing standards; however, there
are requizements which SAFENET references that are not yet completely formulated and
are currently in draft status. SAFENET's Network Development Guidance and
Conformance Test Guidance are two such requirements whose standards are listed as
drafts. The Development Guidance and the Conformance Test Guidance are very crucial
for SAFENET development. Systems Analyst and Designers will use these two manuals
extensively to develop their implementation, in conjunction with the SAFENET standards
manual. In addition, the Quality Assurance and Testing team will use these two manuals
extensively to develop a test package. As a result of these two important publications being
in their draft stages of development, the difficulty of testing a SAFENET implementation
greatly increases. Consequently, the issue of whether we can implement SAFENET and
perform the conformance testing without these two publications, begins to favor having Lhe
availability of both publications. Development and testability are greatly enhanced with the
19
availability of both the SAFENET Network Development Guidance and the SAFENET
Conformance Test Guidance.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SAFENET STANDARD
While SAFENET represents a major step forward in communications connectivity,
this breakthrough is not without its share of problems and potential pitfalls. Typically,
problems are associated with or attributed to any new introductory system. The current
manual of SAFENET's standard is neither a users manual nor a technical manual. It is
essentially a SAFENET standard document of specification that Development teams can
use as guidelines for creating, implementing and testing a SAFENET network.
Consequently, the current standard does not contain tutorials or a listing of descriptive
features from a users' point of view. The standards manual is inadequate for describing
specific features, user protocol interfaces, and for navigating between and within, protocols.
These features are expected to be contained in an implementor's users manual.
Additionally, the current standard while containing much technical information is
insufficient in that context, and the manual alone lacks the technical data necessary to
facilitate a SAFENET installation in accordance with Military Specifications (MIL-
SPECS).
Most of the fiber optic components used commercially meet MEL-SPECS, that is they
conform to the quality control standard demanded by MIL-SPECS; however, the fiber optic
bypass switch, contained within the TCU, did not perform in accordance with MIL-SPECS
[GREE89]. As mentioned earlier, the fiber optic bypass switch bypasses a station which
does not energize an electrical signal to this sv, itch Consequently, the SAFENET
committee will have to expend research and developr-- resources in this area to comply
with MEL-SPECS. The specification of militarized conipnents makes SAFENET lose the
modular "plug" compatibility desired with standard off-the-shelf commerically available
components, but this is seen as a necessary trade-off to enhance reliability and survivability.
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In theory, ANSI FDDI can support the reliability and survivability features that are
proposed for SAFENET, called dual path reconfiguration. SAFENET's approach to
enhanced survivability was to initially specify the wrap method and after that specification
is completed to actively work on development of a specification which uses both ring hop
and wrap methods [GREE89]. The ANSI FDDI standard provides for the dual ring wrap
reconfiguration technique; however, the ring hop reconfiguration technique is not
supported in ANSI FDDI. The Navy's interest is expected to have a positive impact on
development of the ring hop feature. But, whether this hop capability does become in
reality a viable reconfiguration technique will depend on whether FDDI chip set
manufacturers find the hop method cost effective to implement.
Another major area of concern is the support for time synchronization. The
distribution of high precision, synchronized, digital time value among the components of a
distributed real time system on a platform wide scale is one of the requirements that exist
in all Navy SAFENET tactical systems. During the operational employment of a tactical
system or platform, time synchronization is needed continually. The SAFENET Time
Service (STS) provides for the distribution of time information and the synchronization of
distributed clocks within a system. This capability is necessary for activities such as
correlating information provided by various sensors to control weapons, to conduct post
event reconstruction of critical events and to accomplish time critical diagnostic tests.
In searching for a candidate protocol for time synchronization, the SAFENET
committee found that no true industry-wide standard existed [GREE89]. The Network
Time Protocol (NTP), which utilizes a hardware clock of identifiable accuracy bound at
each computing element employs a logical synchronized clock as its base. To support the
STS each station or node is required to have a local time source, called a Network Clock.
The Network Clock includes both the software and hardware components necessary to
implement a time source. The STS is partitioned into three functional areas: the clock
synchronization service, the user time service, and the time management service. Thus, the
STS resident in each node uses the Network Clock to provide the current value of time,
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clock quality and accuracy of time value to users in the local SAFENET node and to
synchronize with other Network Clocks in the network. It is anticipated that major
platforms will have clocks utilizing satellite synchronization; this concept appears to
facilitate the Navy's application.
The prototyping activity in progress within the NGCR community is looked upon to
supply the critical answer as to whether distributed Network Clocks will satisfy naval
requirements. Surprisingly, SAFENET has established no error bounds or performance
requirements for the individual Network Clocks in a network. It is assumed that the system
implementors will use components of sufficient quality to meet the system specific
requirements. The quality of the components used will have a direct impact on the level of
synchronization achieved. In all aspects, this represents a potential pitfall; clock
synchronization performance is a critical area that will require close attention during
system design. The performance requirements of the system will need to be specified and
the appropriate configuration parameters determined.
One primary necessity for naval tactical systems is the need to support real time
communications, be it, periodic and aperiodic, multicast and point to point, or low latency
communications. The ability to delay or even abort low value communications in favor of
more urgent communications is a problem for both present and future applications,
particularly in the event of momentary insufficient data communication resources
[GREE89]. Because of the nature of timed token behavior, ANSI FDDI provides only two
levels for data frames, synchronous and asynchronous traffic. This methodology has no
effect on which station obtains the right to transmit data next. The basis for SAFENET I,
the IEEE 802.5 standard provides a three bit priority field which supports eight levels of
priority and is used for selecting the token holder, the next station allowed to transmit
frames. The viewpoint of the SAFENET committee is that eight levels of priority is
inadequate for meeting system requirements. SAFENET did not provide any real time
specification for this area and thus this led to the SAFENET Lightweight Protocol profile.
The Lightweight Protocol candidate selected was the XTP protocol which is non-
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proprietary, has the potential for industry standardization and provides the needed support
for real time communications. The development of SAFENET requirements used the XTP
protocol as a reference for what is possible and practical and also as a means of feedback
to the XTP developers the requirements which were not met by the current version of the
XTP protocol. Thus, the key and potential problem for the Lightweight Protocol profile is
how well it supports real time, prioritized traffic in present and future applications.
Presently, in the Lightweight profile only the XTP SAFENET hex address format can
be used [HDBK92]. Particularly in stressful moments, hex addressing does not lend itself
very well to human recall as the primary means of station addressing. Within the 0SI
profile, given a logical name known by the application, the Directory Services will provide
the needed addressing information. However, no specification exists for real time users not
using OSI as the communication protocol, and since SAFENET allows a non-standard
approach for the Application, Presentation, and Session layers as well as the Lightweight
Protocol underneath, a major problem exists here.
The Lightweight profile's multicast capability envisioned for SAFENET is limited to
a single logical LAN segment; this may not be the optimal approach. Naval combat
platforms in hostile environments should have the ability to broadcast across multiple
LANs to report tactical and strategic casualties (Engineering, Weapons, etc.) to decision
makers. The issue of multicast capability to multiple LANs should be reviewed to
determine its value to decision makers.
SAFENET addresses the issue of clock granularity, but in terms of clock accuracy, no
guidance is established for the performance requirements of the individual network clocks
in a network. Determining the system clock resolution is needed to accurately determine
the amount of time taken in point to point data transfers. For example, consider a radar
target that is passed to weapons for engagement. Clock resolution and synchronization is
what is required in this real time scenario for a successful engagement. Without these two,
resolution and synchronization, how can a target be engaged, if we do not know whether
the data is late, therefore useless or an actual prediction. This issue of clock performance,
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resolution and synchronization is a potential pitfall because the determination of what is
"sufficient" component quality is left up to the system engineer.
Security as pertains to the protection of data that is transferred on the network is the
final area of concern. Although it may not be necessary for all implementations of
SAFENET to provide security services, security implementations will be necessary in
some platforms. For example, a platform with an implementation that involves data
transfers of multiple classification will require a risk analysis to determine which security
services to provide. Satisfying the security requirements as provided in MIL-HDBK-818-
I (still in drafting stage) may prove difficult to implement and yet, still conform to
SAFENET's standard.
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V. TESTING FIBER OPTIC LINKS
The design points for a communication link are many and require careful
consideration. The band width-length specified for SAFENET Laser or LED with
multimode, graded index fiber can support data rates from 10 to several hundred Mbps over
distances ranging from 10 meters to 200 kilometers. To design a reliable SAFENET
communications data link, a through survey and analysis of system requirements is
necessary.
The maximum tolerable bit error rate for the system must be determined. The bit error
rate is the probability that an error has been detected in a received bit. The determination
of the bit error rate is a critical element in the total SAFENET communications system
performance. The bit error rate for a metallic connection is approximately 10-6; whereas, a
bit error rate of 10- 9 is commonly used for fiber optic data links. The bit error rate is also a
product of receiver sensitivity. The total allowable power loss for the link is the difference
in the power provided by the source and the power required by the detector. Additionally,
some spare power must be present to account for temperature variations, diode aging and
bend loss on the fiber. The above criteria represent the major points in fiber optic data link
design.
In the case of ANSI FDDI, the single most important factor is the bit error probability
(Pe). If the Pe is too high, the need for frame retransmission occurs more frequently; if it is
too small, the system will be prohibitively expensive. The Pe for FDDI is 2.5 x 10-10 which
is easily attainable with current optical fiber technology. As long as the signal-to-noise ratio
is sufficient, the required Pe is attainable. Conversely, if the signal-to-noise ratio is
insufficient, the Pe will tend toward certainty (1).
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A. LOSS BUDGET
A loss budget analysis is important for ensuring that the SAFENET system will meet
or exceed performance limits. In conventional radio frequency systems like Ethernet or
Token Ring, the signal-to-noise ratio must be large enough to support a specified Pe. For an
optical system, the goal is the same, but the calculations are based on losses specific to the
optical net. The ANSI FDDI standard specifies a Pe of less than 2.5 x 10-10 [ANNA88].
Robert Kimball provides a detailed explanation of the different losses associated with
FDDI [KIMB89]. The reason for conducting this analysis is to determine whether or not
the installation will meet the FDDI requirements and thus be in conformance with
SAFENET. The general form of the decision statistic is:
P >: AI~ +A•d + A~m +- 2 11T
P represents the available power, defined as 11 dB for FDDI. The first term on the right
hand side of the inequality, ,t , is the sum of the aggregate component losses in the link.
These losses include propagation losses due to irregularities in the fiber, connector losses,
splice losses, higher order mode losses (due to refraction inside the fiber), and the Media
Interface Connector (MIC) ferrule delta. The MIC ferrule delta accounts for the difference
between the precision test ferrule and a production ferrule [KIMB89]. MIC is the plug and
receptacle pair that makes the physical connection between the optical fibers and the
transmitter or receiver.
The second term on the right hand side, td , is the dispersion penalty, which accounts
for dispersion losses in the optical fiber. This is a function of bit rate and of several
chromatic characteristics of the LEDs used in FDDI. Within the dispersion penalty
equation, the average segment length component accounts for links that consist of several
spliced segments. This accounts for the bandwidth concatenation phenomena, which may
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cause a bandwidth increase in concatenated fibers over what is normally expected in a
single, unbroken fiber.
The third term on the right hand side, g4m , is the system margin. It represents a
catch-all that allows for variations in the cable plant and a factor that compensates for
timing variations between the light level at the output of the fiber and the light received at
the lens on the receiver.
The final term on the right hand side, 2 is the total variance of the link loss
distribution and is defined as a function of the variances of the dispersion penalty and the
loss distribution.
The final step is to substitute all the intermediate results for the right hand side terms
back into the original equation to verify that we have not exceeded the loss budget. If the
right hand side of the equation exceeds 11 dB, one would need to go back to the SAFENET
installation and figure out where the loss budget can be improved. The area that would
provide the greatest change with the least effort would be the aggregate component loss
factor. Two ways to improve this factor would be to shorten the links between transmitter
and receiver or reduce the number of connectors. Obviously, there will be instances where
it is impractical to alter this component; consequently, other components on the right hand
side of the inequality will have to be evaluated.
B. SYSTEM THROUGHPUT
Theoretically, networks can approach 100% transmission efficiency, but there are
certain trade-offs to be addressed. Contention based protocols which approach 100%
transmission efficiency have excessive wait delays associated with them. Collision free
protocols such as ANSI FDDI are better suited for approaching the transmission efficiency
limit.
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1. Clock Accuracy Verification
"Timing analysis is critical to determining how well the SAFENET system
performs over the network. Recent studies have shown that bottlenecks (choke points) in
the protocol stacks and the processors are more detrimental to network speed than the raw
data transfer rate. In order to determine how well the SAFENET profiles perform, it is
necessary to time different data transfers and compare them. Determining the system clock
resolution is needed to accurately determine how long data transfers from one point to
another take. Inaccurate timinr ,,oulc - .opardize the validity of any data collected.
2. Timing Test Procedurt
To attain a more meaningful result from data transfer analyses, data transfers
should be conducted under normal net loading and under no load "ideal" conditions. Test
sets should consist of two groups of file transfers. The test files should be selected based on
size. The criteria for size is outlined in the following paragraphs.
The largest data set must be large enough to exceed the size of the buffers on the
interface cards. Care must be taken in selecting an appropriate size file and yet minimize
the effects (by percentage) of overhead.
The next file has to be smaller than the aforementioned file, but larger than the size
of an FDDI packet. The space reserved for data is 4478 bytes in an FDDI packet. Once
more, care must be taken to select an appropriate size file while minimizing the effects (by
percentage) of overhead. FDDI has no minimum packet size. Percentage of overhead is
calculated by dividing the number of bytes of overhead by the number of data bytes, then
multiplying the result by 100.
Validating operational specifications set forth by manufacturers and SAFENET's
standard and testing for proper installation are dominant reasons for collecting system
measurements. Of particular interest are the fiber attenuation, band width, bit error rate,
transmitter and receiver coupled power, connector loss, splice loss and the signal-to-noise
ratio. Some measurements for conformance determination are to be taken before, during
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and after installation. Fortunately, test equipment in conjunction with the theoretical and
empirical analyses are available to measure and test each area of concern. The Consultative
Committee International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT) has produced
recommendations for test methods to which, it is hoped, most SAFENET component
manufacturers and test equipment manufacturers will adhere. The testing procedure is, test
all parts and components before installation, test all parts and components after installation,
and perform integration tests by testing subsystems and entire systems after installation.
For complete systems tests, ensure data test sets emulate valid data; this will ensure that the
results obtained are meaningful.
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vi. TESTING SAFENET'S IMPLEMENTATION PROFILES
A. TEST METHOD
In this section, the test procedure is described; the following description is actually a
refinement of the method described in [MILL90]. From the SAFENET standard, Finite
State Machine Diagrams of the protocols contained within the SAFENET profiles were
created. From these diagrams, predicate-action tables for systems of communicating
machines were created for the OSI and Light Weight implementations. The test procedure's
initial input is a protocol specified as a system of communicating machines and the output
is a complete test sequence and an Input/Output diagram. In order to proceed from the
specification of a protocol machine or profile implementation to a test sequence,
identification of the shared and local variables is necessary. The shared and local variables
present a way for the tester to provide input to and observe output from the machine during
testing. The test of each edge, transition, is treated as a separate, individual test, and may
modify some or all of the.shared and local variables.
The format of each single edge, transition sequence is
St il1,2,...in/Wo,02 .... Om SE
where S, is the state of the machine at the start of the test, i1,i2 .... in are the values of
the input variables before the test, 0 ,0 2,....om are the values of the output variables after the
test, and SE is the state of the machine at the end of the test. The input and output variables
are determined before testing begins and are taken from the shared and local variables of
the machine or profile. The procedure consists of preliminary steps, the test sequence
generating procedure, and refining steps.
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1. Preliminary Steps
I. From the machine specification finite state diagram, mark each transition
whose name appears on more than one transition or edge. Each such instance for a given
name is given a separate distinguishing label.
2. From the predicate-action table note the number of distinct conditions or
clauses in each enabling predicate. Mark each clause.
3. For each shared variable x, determine if x is an input variable, output variab
or both an input and output variable. For each x which is both input and output, split x into
two variables, x, and xO for testing purposes.
4. For each local variable 1, determine if 1 is used as an interface to the higher
layer user of this profile or protocol. If such is the case, mark I as input, output or both. Each
such local variable is an input variable if it appears in an enabling predicate and a output
variable if it appears in an action on the left side of an assignment arrow. If 1 is both input
and output, it is split into variables 11 and 10 for testing purposes.
Step I is to ensure that each instance of each transition is tested. A protocol
specification may have the same transition name on more than one arc; this step provides a
degree of certainty that every arc is tested. Step 2 ensures that each clause is tested
individually, if possible. An enabling predicate may consist of several clauses, any one of
which may be true, allowing the transition to execute. In steps 3 and 4, the shared and local
variables are identified. Shared variables provide the means of communication between the
machine and other protocol entities within a profile. Local variables allow communication
with the user of the protocol or profile. In essence, these variables are the means the test
designer has of giving inputs to the machine and observing its actions.
In some system of communicating machine specifications, additional variables are
defined that are used internally by the protocol or profile machine and are not visible to the
user (upper layer(s) of the protocol) or the tester. Typically, such variables are counters or
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array indices. These variables should not appear in the test sequence as they are not under
the direct control or observation of the tester.
2. Test Sequence Generating Procedure
1. S1 (-- initial-state
2. Let t = (p,a) be an untested transition from an arbitrary state. What this
notation means is that the current transition being tested , t, has the predicate, p, as input
and the action,a, as output.
(a) Determine the values of the input variables which make exactly one of the
untested values of p true. Check to see if these values allow any other transition from this
state to be executed. If so, set additional input variables to values that ensure that only the
transition being tested is enabled. Fill in the necessary input variables, and mark the others
DC for "don't care."
(b) Determine and mark the expected values for the output variables. In addition
record the expected values assumed by the local variables.
(c) Determine the expected next state and set SE to it.
(d) Determine if SE is transient; if it is not, label it as a "stop state" and proceed
to step 3. Within the confines of the test procedure, a state is transient if one or more of its
enabling predicates is true upon reaching the state. This means that the machine can
proceed to another state without having to wait for further input from the tester.
(e) Attempt to make SE into a stop state by setting DC values such that when
state SE is reached, none of its enabling predicates are true. If successful, proceed to step 3.
(f) SE is a transient state. If more than one transition leaving SE is enabled,
arbitrarily select one and set the input not yet specified, such that only one transition leaving
SE is enabled. Set t = (p,a) to this transition.
3. Output this test S ili2,...n/o1,o2 ... Om SE as the next test in the sequence.
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4. Mark the clause just tested. If all clauses in transitio)n t are now tested, mark
t as tested. If all transitions are now marked as tested, exit to "refining steps." Otherwise,
proceed to step 5.
5. Set S1 to SE. If SI is a stop state, proceed to step 2,; otherwise, proceed to
step 2(b).
Step 2(a) attempts to test each clause separately. For well designed protocols this is
generally true. It is vital in that the tester knows which transition was enabled, and as a
result, caused the transition to occur. In the event that it is not possible to individually test
each clause, the test designer must set the input variables such that the clauses are tested as
meticulously as possible. It is quite possible that such clauses may be tested in conjunction
with one another. However, if a clause cannot be tested individually, the question of clause
necessity to the specification arises.
Steps 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f) are concerned with transient states. If execution of a state
immediately enables another transition, it may prove difficult or even impossible for the
tester to verify that the values contained in the output variables are as expected. For such a
circumstance, the transient state and possible multiple enabling transitions that can not be
controlled with these test methods, could indicate the need to modify the specification for
better testability.
Step 5 initializes the start state of the next test in the sequence to the ending state of
the current test. The advantage here is that the ordering of the tests follow the order of their
occurrence in the actual profile implementation. In order to exercise all parts of a protocol
or profile implementation,some transitions may have to be executed more than once. In
such a circumstance, judgement by the test designer may be needed. This is not necessarily
a cause for concern; in the normal operation of a profile or protocol machine, certain
transitions may be executed more than others. Consequently, during testing the same trend
will likely be true.
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3. Refining Steps
1. Construct the Input/Output state diagram from the test sequence. In this step,
the stop state information is also used, assuming that there is at least one stop state.
2. For each state, determine a shortest Unique Input/Output (UIO) sequence (if
one exists). Append the UIO sequence for SE to the end of the test sequence. If no UIO
sequence for the current SE exists, continue testing transactions (extending the sequence)
until an SE with a UIO is visited.
3. Check for converging transactions which are difficult to test and may require
special handling. These transactions are marked as potential problems.
In step 1, the Input/Output diagram is constructed from the test sequence and is a tool
to help the test designer ensure completeness. This diagram is constructed directly from the
test sequence with the knowledge of "stop states." The diagram's initial state will be initial
state SI; additional states are added for each stop state is encountered.The arcs are directed,
and labeled with the with the values of the input and output variables.
The I/O diagram generated from the test sequence can be viewed as an incomplete
finite state machine specification. However, there is a relationship to the specification
machine, because there is a tour through the specified transactions. It is not identical to the
specification; there are states which are transitory in the specification and does not appear
in the 10 diagram.
The purpose of the final UIO sequence in step 2 serves to verify that the last state
which was reached in the test sequence is indeed the current state of the protocol or profile
machine. Because the details of the machine's implementation are assumed to be "hidden"
from the tester, the existence of at least state with a UIO sequence is necessary. Without the
UIO sequence, there is no way of knowing if the last transition tested, left the machine in
the expected state.
In actuality, the converging transitions, identified in step 3, are distinct transactions,
with identical labels, which originate from different states but terminate at the same state.
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The existence of converging conditions can not be eliminated always and, therefore,
complicates the role of the test designer and makes error detection difficult. These
circumstances may naturally occur in the specification of a protocol, but should be marked
for special observation.
B. APPLICATION OF TEST METHOD
In this section the test generating procedure is illustrated using derived specifications
for two of the SAFENET standard profiles: OSI profile and Lightweight profile. The
profiles are first specified as a system of communicating machines and then the procedure
is given.
1. OSI Profile Specification
The specification of the OSI profile consists of the predicate-action table (Table
1), the specification for each protocol within the profile, given in Figure 8, and the inter-
process shared variable MEDIUM, shown in Figure 9. The single intra-process shared
variable Transfer is used to model the network node's internal bus, which is shared by the
protocols within a node or station. An internal transmission is modeled by a write into this
shared variable. The first field "Transfer.T" takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate
whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second
field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the protocol machine to which
the message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's
address. Fields four through eleven contain the values T or F and are used to control the
intra-process routing; based on the values contained in these variables, the frame's
Destination Address is determined. Finally, the data field contains the data block itself. The
single shared variable MEDIUM is used to model the bus, which is shared by each machine
or network node. A transmission onto the bus is modeled by a write into this shared
variable.The first field "MEDIUM.T" takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate
whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second
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field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the network station to which the
message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's
address; finally, the data field contains the data block itself.
The OSI profile is defined by a finite state machine, a set of local variables and a
predicate-action table. The initial state of each profile machine is state 0, and the shared
variables MEDIUM and Transfer are initially set to contain the respective address of one
of the stations or protocol machines in the DA field.
The local variables inbuf, outbuf, etc. are used for storing data blocks to be
transmitted to or received from other protocols. Outbuf is an array, and can store a
potentially large number of data blocks.
The initial state of each profile machine is state 0 and all local variables are
initially set to empty. The inter-process shared variable MEDIUM initially contains the
address of one station in its DA field. Therefore, the initial system state tuple is (0,..., 0) and
the first transition taken by a station holding the token will be xmittime, or xmit_msg.
Each profile machine has 18 states. In the initial state, 0, the station is quiescent,
merely waiting for an incoming message, a transmit message signal, or a transmit time
synchronization signal. If a frame appears. in the variable MEDIUM with the network
node's own address, the transition to state I is taken. When taking the xmittime transition,
in state 2, the station transmits the data blocks that it has via Transfer, moving to state 3. In
state 3, the station transmits the data blocks it has, moving to state 6. As specified by the
SAFENET standard, synchronization frames are sent via the ISO CLNP Protocol
[HDBK921 page. 37. In state 6, the data blocks are formed into datagrams and transmitted,
moving to state 17. In state 17, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state
18. In state 18, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all of its
messages are sent; the station then returns to state 0. When taking the
xmitclear-logical-msg transition, in state 8, the station transmits the blocks that it has,
moving to either state 9, state 10 or state 11. If in state 9, the station transmits the data
blocks it has moving to state 14. If in state 10, the station transmits the data blocks it has
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moving to state 14. If in state 11, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state
12. From state 12, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 13. If in state
13, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 14. If in state 14, the station
transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 15. From state 15, the station moves to
station 16 after transmitting its data blocks. When in state 16, the station transmits the data
blocks it has moving to states 4, 5, or 6; this transition is based on the message size and its
destination address' location. If in state 4, the station transmits the data blocks it has
moving to state 17; from states 5, or 6, the station transmits its data blocks, moving to state
17. In state 17, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state 18. In state 18,
the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all it messages are sent; the
station then returns to state 0.
The receiving profile station, like all other stations not in possession of the token,
will be in state 0. The message will appear in MEDIUM, with the receiving station's
address in the DA field. The receive transition to state 1 will be taken. In state 1 the data
block is copied and the MEDIUM is cleared by the ready transition. By clearing the
MEDIUM, the receiving station enables the sending station to return to its initial state (0)
or its sending state (18).
For this simplified high-level specification, the channels inter-process and intra-
process are assw led to be error free. This means that the clearing of the medium by the
receiver can be taken as an acknowledgment by the sender. Hence, there is no requirement
for timers, time-outs or error checking on the channel. Although some of the finer details
of the OSI profile are omitted, this specification contains the main idea of the OSI profile,
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Each machine within the OSI profile in Figure 8 performs the following:
"* State 0 In the initial state, the machine is quiescent, merely waiting to process a request
or transmission.
"* State 1 In the receive state, the machine copies an incoming message from the bus and
acknowledges receipt of the message by clearing the bus.
-State 2 The SAFENET Time Service protocol provides for the distribution of time
information and the synchronization of distributed clocks within a system.
"* State 3 In addition to Lightweight and Xpress Transfer Protocol support, the OSI
Connectionless transport protocol directly supports STS's protocol data unit
transfer. It provides the user with the ability to transmit a single unit of data,
datagram, without the requirement of a connection being established.
"* State 4 The ISO End System-to-Intermediate System routing exchange protocol passes
address information among all stations that are on the same LAN segment or
through intermediate stations. The ES/IS protocol provides stations with the
ability to associate a data link layer address with a given network layer address.
"" State 5 The ISO Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System intra-domain routing
protocol provides SAFENET networks with dynamic determination of routes
used to pass data between intermediate systems.
* State 6 The ISO Connectionless Network protocol provides services for network routing
and for the segmentation and reassembly of transport layer messages that are
too large for the underlying communications service. Additionally, the ISO
CLNP has multicast data transfer capability, but limits the scope of transfers to
users on a single LAN segment.
"* State 7 The Private Coimmunications protocol provides a means for secure
communications between network stations.
"* State 8 The Directory Services provides a mapping from "user friendly" names
(application entity titles) to presentation service access point addresses
required in communication instances.
"* State 9 The File Transfer, Access, and Management protocol provides services for
transferring information in the form of files among application processes and
file stores.
"• State 10 The Association Control Service Element protocol provides services for the
establishment and termination of application layer associations and a standard
service for application layer protocols to communicate common parameters.
- State I 1 The System Management Application Service Element protocols specifies the
management functions which are supported in a system node, and defines the
semantics and abstract syntaxes of information transferred. It uses CMISE for
communication.
- State 12 The Common Management Information Service Element protocol provides a
common message framework for management procedures supplying both data-
manipulation and notification/operation-oriented services.
-State 13 The Remote Operations Service Element protocol is used in support of CMISE,
and provides a simple, uniform service for remotely invoking operations and
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then receiving correlated replies to those operations.
"• State 14 The ISO Presentation protocol is concerned with the syntax of data the data
exchanged between application entities and resolves differences in format and
data representation. The presentation layer defines the syntax used between
application entities and provides for the selection and subsequent modification
of the representation to be used.
"* State 15 The ISO Session protocol provides the mechanism for controlling the dialogue
between applications. At a minimum, it provides a means for two application
processes to establish and use a connection.
"* State 16 The ISO Connection-Oriented Transport protocol provides for the
establishment, maintenance, and termination of a logical connection between
transport users. It allows connection-related features such as flow control, error
control, and sequenced delivery.
"* State 17 The Logical Link Control protocol provides three services: Unacknowledged
connectionless service which supports point-to-point, multipoint and broadcast
in a datagram style of service, Connection-oriented services which provides
flow control, sequencing, and error recovery, Acknowledged connectionless
service which provides for acknowledgment of individual frames and supports
point-to-point transfers.
"* State 18 The FDDI Token LAN protocol provides the ability to get data on and off the
physical medium in a controlled manner.
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t time; m = map; p = private; DA = destination address; SA = source address
Inter-process variable
MEDIUM vT JDA SAI P FData
lntra-process variable
Transfer IT JDA SA P IM IES IIS ICLjFT ACS SMA4 Data
SHARED
local variables
inbuf T DAl SA P Data
-uu I T DAS -P Dt
outbuf 1 T DAI SA P Data
ouzbufng T DA SA P Data
clastsjsg T DAI SA DataI L at
co-trans....msg T DA SA ES SCLDataCorrnssgESISCLDaa=
'xmit-clearjnsg DA[SSA P M FTAM ACSE SMAS Data
private jnsg DA SA P M FTAM ACSE SMAS Data
xmt~lerloicl-s DAS rM AS SDt
xmit-slearj-ogical-msg DA SA P M FTAM ACSE SMAS Data
xmitýprivate oiamsg DA SA P M FTAM ACSE SMAS Data
xmit-clearý_map..msg DA SA P M FTAM ACSE SMAS Data












Figure 9 051 Network Node Data Structure
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Table 1: OS! PREDICATE-ACTIONS
rasto Yrjcate Ac ion
receive MEDIUM.DA =i inbuf +-.MEDIUM
ready true MEDIUM+- 0
Xmit-time outbuf (n) * 0A outbUf(n).t =true Transfer +- outbuf (n) A outbuf (n) +- 0
sts-msg sts-msg (t, data) = (true, msg) Transfer +- sts-msg A StSMSg 4- 0
pnvate..msg (p-msg) p..msg (p, m, data) = (true, DC, msg) Transfer 4-pmsg A pmýISg 4- 0
xmit-clearjlogicaLmsg xWln (p, m, data) = (false, true, msg) Transfer 4-XClM A XClM +- 0
xmit-private-logical-mg xplm (p, m, data) = (true, true, msg) Transfer 4-XPlm A xplM +- 0
xmit-clear-.msg (xcm) xcm (p m, smase) = (false, false, true) Transfer 4-XCM A XCM +- 0
xmit-clear...msg (xcm) xcm (p~m. acse) (false, false, true) Transfer 4-XCM A XCM +- 0
xmitclearmrsg (xcm) xcm (p. m, ftam) (false, false, true) Transfer +- XCM A XCM +- 0
xmit..clear..,mapmrsg xcmm (p, m. ftam) = (false, true, true) Transfer 4-XCMM A xcmm 4 0
xmiLclearmap.msg xcmm (p. m, smase) = (false, true, true Transfer 4-XCMM A XCMM 4 0
xmit clear-map msg xcmm (p. m, acse) = (false, true, true) Transfer 4-XCMM A xcmm 4 0
xmit-private-map.msg xpmm (p, mn, smase) = (true, true, true: Transfer 4-Xpmm A Xpmm 4 0
xmit-pirvate-map-mng xpmm (p, m, ftam) = (true, true, true) Transfer 4-Xpmm A XpMM 40
xmit-prvatejnapmsg xpmm (p, m, acse) = (true, true, true) Transfer 4-xpmm A XPMM 4 0
xmit-.private...msg (xpm) xpm (p m, ftam) =(true, false, true) Transfer 4- XPM A Xpm 40
xmit~prvatemrsg (xpm) xpm (p, m, acse) = (true, false, true) Transfer 4-XpM A XPM i 0
xmit~prvate-msg (xpm) xpm (p, m. smase) = (true, false, true) Transfer 4-Xpm A xpm 4 0
ftam-sgfam_ms*0Transfer 4-ftam-msg A ftam-msg +- 0
acse..msg acse...msg * 0 Transfer 4-acse msg A acse~msg +- 0
smase..msg smase..msg * 0 Transfer 4-smase.msg A smase~msg 4-0
cmisemsg cmise..msg * 0 Transfer 4-cnise..mSg A cmise..msg 4-0
rose-mg rose..msg * 0 Transfer 4- rose msg A rosejnsg 0
presentation-.msg (pm) pm* 0 Transfer 4-pm A pm +- 0
session msg (sin) sin* 0 Transfer 4-Si A sn +- 0
co-trans-msg (cotm) cotem * 0 A CotinCS WWru Transfer 4-COtM A COti +- 0
co_trans-insg (cotm) cotm * 0 A COtm.is= true Transfer 4-coti A COti 4- 0
co trans-msg (cotin) 0ots * 0 A COtMAc Wftru Transfer 4-cotm A COtm 4-0
cl~trans..insg (citm) ditm * 0 Transfer 4-CItm A CUtM 4- 0
esfts..msg esfjs..msg * 0 Transfer 4-es/isjnmSg A es/is,_msg 4-0
is/isinsg isfis...isg * 0 Transfer 4-iSfISmFSg A Wsis...iSg 0
clnp-insg clnp..msg * 0 Transfer 4-clnp..Insg A cbipjnsg 0
11c..msg Uc...isg * 0 Transfer +- lCmsg A IlCinsg +- 0
insg..sent treMEDIUM +-0
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1. OSI Test Sequence Generation
First the preliminary steps are carried out; these steps determine the exact format
of the tests. The measures employed are primarily concerned with input and output
variables. After the preliminary steps, the tests are generated. For ease of reference the
numbering below corresponds to the steps in the test procedure.
a. Preliminary Steps
(1) From Figure 8's Lightweight profile specification finite state diagram, we
see that all transition labels are unique; therefore, no action is required.
(2) All transitions have single clause enabling predicates; therefore, no action
is required.
(3) The shared variable MEDIUM is both an input and an output variable;
therefore it is split into two variables MEDIUMI and MEDIUMO for testing purposes. The
intra-process shared variable Transfer is both an input and an output variable; therefore it
is split into two variables Transfer, and TransferO for testing purposes
(4) The local variables outbuf, sts_msg, private-msg,
xmitprivateiogical_msg, xmit_clear_logicalmsg, xmitclear msg,
xmit_clear.mapmsg, xmitprivate-map.msg, xmiLprivate-msg, ftam-msg, acse-msg,
smase msg, cmise.msg, rose-msg, presentation.msg, session_msg, co transmsg,
cltrans-msg, lUc.msg, clnp..msg, es/is..msg and is/is,.msg are both input and output
variables; therefore they are split into two respective variables, for example private-msgi
and private msgO, for testing purposes.
Note that in step 2, the cotransmsg and xmittime are not separated into
two different clauses because both conditions must be true for the transition to be enabled.
From these preliminary steps, we can see that the test will adhere to the
following form:
SI MEDIUM, Transfer1 outbuf1 ... llc-msg1 / MEDIUMO TransferO outbufo...
llc-msgO inbuf SE
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Now we are ready to begin generating the test sequence.
b. Test Sequence Generation
(1) We begin in Ihe initial state, 0. In step 2 we may choose any untested
transition emanating from state 0; we select the xmit_clear_msg transition.(step 9).
2(a) According to the predicate-action table, to enable this transition the local
variable xmitclear-msg must contain data for processing and the DA field of xmit msg is
assumed to be state 9's address. The remaining fields may have any values, and are
indicated by an "x" in Table 2. The other input variables are set to DC for "don't care."
2(b) When the transition occurs, Transfer copies the data from
xmit_clearmsg, and xmitclearmsg is set to empty.
2(c) SE is set to the expected end state for this test, which is state 9.
(3) Noting that the next state is a stop state, this completes the first test in the
sequence, and the appropriate values are shown in Table 2.
(4) This clause and transition are now marked "tested."
(5) The value of S, is now set to 9 and another iteration starting at stepl0 is
called for.
The next iteration of the procedure selects the ftammsg transition, and the values
selected are shown as the tenth test entered in Table 2. The expected ending state for this
tenth test is 14. The next iteration of the procedure selects the presentation-msg transition,
and the values selected are shown as the eleventh test entered in Table 2. The expected
ending state for this tenth test is 15. From state 15 in test step 12, we take the session-msg
transition. The expected ending state resulting from this transition is 16.
At the next iteration, the co_trans_msg transition is taken; the expected ending state
for this thirteenth test is 4. From state 4, we take the es/is-msg transition. In test step
fourteen, the expected ending state resulting from this transition is 17. From state 17, we
take the Uc_msg transition; the expected ending state for this fifteenth test is 18. From state
44
18, we exercise the msg-sent transition using the "true" predicate, which leads back to the
initial state.
The remaining untested transitions are executed in a similar manner resulting in a final
test sequence of 356 steps. T1e values of the input and output variables for all of these tests
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2. Lightweight Profile Specification
The specification of the Lightweight profile consists of the predicate-action table
(Table 2), the specification for each protocol within the profile, given in Figure 10, and the
inter-process shared variable MEDIUM, shown in Figure 11. The single intra-process
shared variable Transfer is used to model the network node's internal bus, which is shared
by the protocols within a node or station. An internal transmission is modeled by a write
into this shared variable. The first field Transfer.T takes the value T or F, which is used to
indicate whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The
second field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the protocol machine to
which the message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the
originator's address. Fields four through eleven contain the values T or F and are used to
control the intra-process routing; based on the values contained in these variables, the
frame's Destination Address is determined. Finally, the data field contains the data block
itself. The single shared variable MEDIUM is used to model the bus, which is shared by
each machine or network node. A transmission onto the bus is modeled by a write into this
shared variable.The first field MEDIUM.T takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate
whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second
field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the network station to which the
message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's
address; finally, the data field contains the data block itself.
The Lightweight profile is defined by a finite state machine, a set of local variables
and a predicate-action table. The initial state of each profile machine is state 0, and the
shared variables MEDIUM and Transfer are initially set to contain the respective address
of one of the stations or protocol machines in the DA field.
The local variables inbuf, outbuf, etc. are used for storing data blocks to be
transmitted to or received from other protocols. Outbuf is an array, and can store a
potentially large number of data blocks.
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The initial state of each profile machine is state 0 and all local variables are
initially set to empty. The inter-process shared variable MEDIUM initially contains the
address of one station in its DA field. Therefore, the initial system state tuple is (0,...,0) and
the first transition taken bv a station holding the token will be ,•mit-time, or xmit-msg.
Each profile machine has 10 states. In the initial state, 0, the station is quiescent,
merely waiting for an incorning message, a transmit message signal, or a transmit time
synchronization signal. If a frame appears in the variable MEDIUM with the network
node's own address, the transition to state 1 is taken. When taking the xmittime transition,
in state 2, the station transmits the data blocks that it has via Transfer, moving to state 3. In
state 3, the station transmits the datta blocks it has, moving to state 8. As specified by the
SAFENET standard synchronization frames are sent via the ISO CLNP Protocol
[HDBK921 page. 37. In state 8, the data blocks are formed into datagrams and transmitted,
moving to state 9. In state 9, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state 10.
In state 10, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all it messages are
sent; the station then returns to state 0. When taking the xmitmsg transition, in state 4, the
station transmits the blocks that it has, moving to either state 3 or state 5. If in state 3, the
station transmits the data blocks it has moving to states 6, 7, or 8: this transition is based on
the message size and its destination address' location. If in state 5, the station transmits the
data blocks it has moving to states 6, 7, 8, or 9: From states 5, 6, 7, or 8, the station transmits
its data blocks, moving to state 9. In state 9, the station transmits any data blocks it has
moving to state 10. In state 10, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or
all of its messages are scnt: the station then returns to state 0.
The receiving profile station, like all other stations not in possession,of the token,
will be in state 0. The message will appear in \MEDIUM, with the receiving station's
address in the DA field. The receive transition to state I will be taken. In state 1 the data
block is copied and the MEDIUM is cleared by the ready transition. By clearing the
MEDIUM, the receiving station enables the sending station to return to its initial state (0)
or its sending state ( 10)
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For this simplified high-level specification, the channels inter-process and intra-
process are assumed to be error free. This means that the clearing of the medium by the
receiver can be taken as an acknowledgment by the sender. Hence, there is no requirement
for timers, time-outs or error checking on the channel. Although some of the finer details
of the Lightweight profile are omitted, this specification contains the main idea of the
Lightweight profile, and provides sufficient detail for the generation of a test sequence.
Table 3: LIGHTWEIGHT PREDICATE-ACTIONS
Transition Predicate Action
receive MEDIUM.DA = i inbuf +- MEDIUM
ready true MEDIUM +-0
xmitjtime outbuf(n) *O• outbuf(n)t = true Transfer 4- outbuf(n) Aoutbuf(n) +-0
stsmsg stsmsg (t, data) = (true. msg) Transfer 4- sts msg
xmit msg xmit_msg * 0 Transfer 6- xMitmsg A xmitmsg 4- 0
lightwt.cLmsg (Iwcm) lwcm * 0 Transfer +- lwcm A IwcM -- 0
xfer xtp msg (xxm) xxm *0 Transfer +- xxm A xxm 6- 0
cl_Msg (xpm) xpm (t, cl) = (true, true) Transfer+- xpM A xpm 4-
xtplrte-msg (xrn) .rxm (t, es) = (true, true) Transfer 4- xrM A xrm - 0
xtpne_msg (xrm) xrm (t, is) = (true, true) Transfer +- Xr A X-M +- 0
xtprte msg (xrm) xrm (t, cl) = (true, true) Transfer' 4- XrM A xrm 4- 0
es/is-msg es/is-msg 0 Transfer +- es/ismsg A es/is-msg +- 0
is/is msg is/is._rmsg *0 Transfer +- is/ismsg A is/ismsg - 0
clnp-msg clnp.msg *0 Transfer +- clnp-msg A clnp-msg +- 0
xtp msg xtp msg * 0 Transfer +- xtpmsg A xtpmsg +- 0
Uc-msg llc-jsg * 0 Transfer +- llcmrnsg A Ilcjsg +- 0





































Figure 10 Lightweight Profile Specification
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Each machine within the Lightweight profile in Figure 10 performs the following:
"* State 0 In the initial state, the machine is quiescent, merely waiting to process a request
or transmission.
"* State 1 In the receive state, the machine copies an incoming message from the bus and
acknowledges receipt of the message by clearing the bus.
"* State 2 The SAFENET Time Service protocol provides for the distribution of time
information and the synchronization of distributed clocks within a system.
"* State 3 In addition to Lightweight and Xpress Transfer Protocol support, the OSI
Connectionless transport protocol directly supports STS's protocol data unit
transfer. It provides the user with the ability to transmit a single unit of data,
datagram, without the requirement of a connection being established.
"• State 4 The Lightweight application services consist of a set of communication service
primitives which can be implemented to provide a user with direct, efficient
data transfer capabilities.
"• State 5 The Xpress Transfer protocol provides services which achieve increased
efficiency and performance by combining the connection process with the data
transfer process.
"* State 6 The ISO End System-to-Intermediate System routing exchange protocol passes
address information among all stations that are on the same LAN segment or
through intermediate stations. The ES/S protocol provides stations with the
ability to associate a data link layer address with a given network layer address.
"* State 7 The ISO Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System intra-domain routing
protocol provides SAFENET networks with dynamic determination of routes
used to pass data between intermediate systems.
* State 8 The ISO Connectionless Network protocol provides services for network routing
and for the segmentation and reassembly of transport layer messages that are
too large for the underlying communications service. Additionally, the ISO
CLNP has multicast data transfer capability, but limits the scope of transfers to
users on a single LAN segment.
"• State 9 The Logical Link Control protocol provides three services: Unacknowledged
connectionless service which supports point-to-point, multipoint and broadcast
in a datagram style of service, Connection-oriented services which provides
flow control, sequencing, and error recovery, Acknowledged connectionless
service which provides for acknowledgment of individual frames and supports
point-to-point transfers.
"* State 10 The FDDI Token LAN protocol provides the ability to get data on and off the
physical medium in a controlled manner.
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t = time; DA = destination address; SA = source address
inter-process variable
MEUM TIDAISAIP I Data I
Intra-process variable
Transfer IT DASAl P IM Is IS ICLFT ACS4SMA Data
SHARED
local variables
inbuf IT IDASA I Data
outbuf IT 1DA SA Data
"outbuf n T I 1DA !SA IaData
lightwt- cl-rmsg IT IDA SA IES IIS ICL IData
clmsg ITI D AESISICL Data
xtpjt..M-sg ITID4 Sý ESI ISICLI Data
xtp-msg IT JDAISA Data
lUe-msg IT JDAISA Data
stsý_msg T JDAISAI Data
xmit-msg Ir DAISA Data
xfextpmsg IT DASA Data
clnpjmsg IT DASA Data
ess_msg IT DASA Data
isflsMsg IT JDAISA Data
Figure 11 Lightweight Network Nodes Data Structure
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3. Lightweight Test Sequence Generation
First the preliminary steps are carried out; these steps determine the exact format
of the tests. The measures employed are primarily concerned with input and output
variables. After the preliminary steps, the tests are generated. For ease of reference the
numbering below corresponds to the steps in the test procedure.
a. Preliminary Steps
(1) From Figure 10's Lightweight profile specification finite state diagram,
we see that all transition labels are unique; therefore, no action is required.
(2) All transitions have single clause enabling predicates; therefore, no action
is required.
(3) The shared variable MEDIUM is both an input and an output variable;
therefore it is split into two variables MEDIUM, and MEDIUMO for testing purposes. The
intra-process shared variable Transfer is both an input and an output variable; therefore it
is split into two variables Transferl and TransferO for testing purposes
(4) The local variables outbuf, sts-msg, lightwtscl-msg, cl-msg,
xtprtemsg, xtp-msg, llc-msg, xmitmsg, xfer.xtp-msg, clnp-msg, es/is-msg and is/
is-msg are both input and output variables; therefore they are split into two respective
variables, for example xmintmsg1 and xmit-msgO, for testing purposes.
Note that in step 2, the xtprte-msg and xmit_time are not separated into two
different clauses because both conditions must be true for the transition to be enabled.
From these preliminary steps, we can see that the test will adhere to the
following form:
S, MEDIUM1 Transfer, outbuf1 ... llc-msgI / MEDIUMO Transfero outbufo...
llc.msgO inbuf SE
Now we are ready to begin generating the test sequence.
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b. Test Sequence Generation
(1) We begin in the initial state, 0. In step 2 we may choose any untested
transition emanating from state 0; we select the xmit-msg transition.
2(a) According to the predicate-action table, to enable this transition the local
variable xmitmsg must contain data for processing and the DA field of xmit-msg is
assumed to be state 4's address. The remaining fields may have any values, and are
indicated by an "x" in Table 4. The other input variables are set to DC for "don't care."
2(b) When the transition occurs, Transfer copies the data from xmit-msg, and
xmitmsg is set to empty.
2(c) SE is set to the expected end state for this test, which is state 4.
(3) Noting that the next state is a stop state, this completes the first test in the
sequence, and the appropriate values are shown in Table 4.
(4) This clause and transition are now marked "tested."
(5) The value of S! is now set to 4 and another iteration starting at step 4 is
called for.
The next iteration of the procedure arbitrarily selects the lightwtscl msg transition,
and the values selected are shown as the fourth test entered in Table 4. The expected ending
state for this fourth test is 3.
At the next iteration, the clmsg transition is taken; the expected ending state for this
fifth test is 8. From state 8, we take the clnpmsg transition. The expected ending state
resulting from this transition is 9. From state 9, we take the llc-msg transition; the expected
ending state for this seventh test is 10. From state 10, we exercise the msg-sent transition
using the "true" predicate, which leads back to the initial state.
The remaining untested transitions are executed in a similar manner resulting in a final
test sequence of 32 steps. The values of the input and output variables for all of these tests
are shown in Table 4.
57
IamUUUU* 
-** m m UUm
S SS E uE lU
E E-E
-j a .' 
' 
-c
2 5 E o 40 c.4 E p cp c 7
rd -,. U
Sm 58








*** mm... mm. mm...... mm.. - m ninE
a- -





- - - - -
- 0 0 0 0 0OOO% ca-o'r O-0 
'fOOO - 0 e 
 . .j











 - - - -
Si
 I 0-'ct-o0- 
 'C r- O'-
in' *NEE mum 

60
VU. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH
The goal of this thesis was to present a series of test sequences for the SAFENET
communication protocol. The procedure takes as input high level SAFENET profiles that
are specified as a system of communicating machines, and gives as output, complete test
sequences for SAFENET's OSI and Lightweight profiles. A brief specification of
SAFENET's OSI and Lightweight profiles was given using the system of communicating
machines model, and test sequences were generated.
The test method described and employed here further demonstrates the flexibility of
the system of communicating machines model. A protocol can be specified, verified, and
tested using techniques based on this model. The concept was expanded and applied to a
high level profile which encompassed several protocols. In the test procedure, all transition
instances in the finite state machine specification is tested in conjunction with each enabling
predicate clause. The preliminary steps were employed to determine the input and output
variables; the sequence generating procedure was employed to assist in fault coverage. The
example test sequences for the OSI and Lightweight profiles were used to demonstrate the
application of the specification and testing methods associated with the system of
communicating machines model. Since these profiles have the potential for wide spread use
in present and future naval combatants, their existence as ,ystem of communicating
machines model further illustrate the applicability and usefulness of this method. Utilizing
a protocol specification method which places emphasis on testing yields better results than
using a specification method that was not designed with conformance testing in mind.
Some of the current literature discusses the correctness of a test sequence; their
apparent emphasis is on shortening the sequence length. However, the system of
communicating machine test procedure emphasizes the ability of the sequence to detect
errors rather than the achievement of an optimal test sequence length. This test method can
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only test for the presence of desirable behavior in a protocol or profile machine. Given the
current level of technology, it is not practical to exhaustively test for the presence of
undesirable behavior since all possible errors that could occur in an implementation can not
be foreseen.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The issue of security services for data on platforms with a SAFENET implementation
exercising data transfers of multiple classifications will have to be addressed. Commercial
LANs have encountered and solved this problem with respect to sharing a LAN with a
competitor, but with the performance constraints placed upon SAFENET, the completed
risk -nalysis should provide some definitive system configuration with respect to security
services. Consequently, research effort must be expended to directly address this issue.
With this test method being as straight for-ward and easy to apply as it is, it should lend
itself very well to automation; research ihito to the feasibility of this could possibly prove
very valuable in the wide spread acceptance of this test method. Further research could
concentrate on decomposing the protocols within a SAFENET profile and applying the test
method. In addition, future research could concentrate on. extending the error detection
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